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Set against a background of calls for evidence-based practice, this paper explores the role of 
evidence and argument in phenomenological research. Drawing on Smith’s (1998) analysis of 
original argument, the author considers how evidence can be discerned, understood, and 
communicated, and the resulting kinds and contexts of knowledge that may be constituted in the 
practice of phenomenological research. Linking Churchill’s (2012) discussion of researcher 
perspectivity with Smith’s analysis of original argument, contrasts are drawn between rhetorical, 
demonstrative, and dialectical approaches to argument, with proposed parallels to first-person, 
second-person, and third-person perspectives explored. Implications for argument-based 




What counts as evidence in phenomenological 
research? Within phenomenology as it is currently 
practised there are many answers to this fundamental 
question. If we consider the myriad ways in which 
evidence can be obtained, examined and understood, 
it is possible to catch a glimpse of the complexity of 
this question. If we then add the rhetorical role of 
evidence in the presentation and justification of 
research findings, the relevance of this question for 
the practice of phenomenology becomes clear. 
Exploring the evidence-based nature of phenomeno-
logical research therefore requires thoughtful 
explication of the multiple meanings of evidence and 
argument. This is my goal for the paragraphs that 
follow. 
 
It is first necessary to explain what I mean by 
evidence. To begin, I reflect on two distinct meanings 
of the term. On the one hand, evidence is something 
one discovers or gathers amidst the process of 
answering a particular set of questions. On the other 
hand, evidence is something one presents in order to 
advance an argument. Phenomenological research 
consists of both kinds of evidence, and each is shaped 
by the epistemology and subsequent methodology 
employed by the researcher. To characterize 
phenomenology as evidence-based is therefore 
accurate but merely the start of a conversation. The 
conversation that should follow (and this is true with 
regard to any form of research) concerns the way in 
which evidence is conceptualized and how it is used 
in the service of answering a research question. 
 
When a researcher poses a question and applies a 
method to addressing that question, he or she does so 
based on assumptions regarding the nature and limits 
of knowledge; in other words, epistemology. These 
assumptions dictate both what counts as evidence and 
how it may be accessed and analyzed. In 
phenomenology, the divergent viewpoints that Sass 
(1989) has called humanism and hermeneutics are 
particularly relevant to epistemology. As I have 
discussed elsewhere (Walsh & Koelsch, 2012), a key 
point of contrast is the conceptualization of the 
subject as either fundamentally self-transparent or 
self-obscure. From the humanistic perspective, 
experience is consciousness and is made accessible 
through procedural and practical effort. In contrast, 
from the hermeneutic viewpoint, experience is 
understood as always involving an implicit context 
The Indo-Pacifi c Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg 
(South Africa) and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty of Regional Professional Studies (Australia) and published in association with 
NISC (Pty) Ltd. The IPJP is available online at www.ipjp.org.
This work is licensed to the publisher under the Creative Commons Attribution Licence 3.0.
65
This volume page number is not for bibliographic reference purposes
ISSN (print): 2079-7222ISSN (online): 1445-7377    
largely outside of the subject’s conscious awareness. 
These distinct positions have given rise to different 
forms of phenomenological research. 
 
The roots of this distinction can of course be traced to 
points of contrast between Husserl and Heidegger. 
However, it must also be acknowledged that each of 
these thinkers presented complex and dynamic lines 
of thought, and that any simple characterization of 
differences entails oversimplification. Keeping this in 
mind, it is still possible to say that Husserlian 
phenomenology is grounded in the conscious 
reflection of participants, while Heideggerian 
phenomenology calls for interpretation of the 
engaged, unreflective ready-to-hand activity of 
participants. Hence, what counts as evidence of lived 
experience can vary considerably across these 
perspectives. 
 
It should be noted that there has been considerable 
intertwining of these perspectives throughout the 
developmental history of phenomenological research. 
Indeed, it is possible to see elements of each 
perspective in the origins of the empirical 
phenomenological method. Although Giorgi (1970) 
situated his method in Husserl’s phenomenology, the 
positional shift this method entailed introduced what 
can be called an interpretive move. Specifically, 
whereas Husserl’s philosophical method calls for a 
(re)turn to the immediate experience of the perceiver 
(i.e. the subject who is also the object of reflection) 
Giorgi’s application of Husserl’s method involves a 
researcher explicating the implicit features of 
participants’ reflective experiential accounts. It was 
this positional shift that led Colaizzi (1973) to 
distinguish between Fundamental Description (based 
on the participants’ reflective account) and 
Fundamental Structure (requiring the researcher’s 
reflective interpretation of the participants’ reflective 
accounts) in phenomenological research. From its 
inception, empirical phenomenological research has 
thus included features of both Husserlian and 
Heideggerian (or, in Sass’s (1989) terminology, 
humanistic and hermeneutic) thought.  
 
Methodologically, the phenomenological epoché and 
the hermeneutic circle are counterpoints that follow 
from the Husserlian and Heideggerian positions (with 
the caveat that these positions were in fact dynamic). 
The epoché is accomplished via bracketing of 
presuppositions in order to freshly experience the 
phenomenon of interest. However, as noted above, 
the character or position of bracketing changed with 
the adaptation of philosophical phenomenology to 
empirical psychological research. In empirical 
phenomenology, the task of bracketing shifts from 
experiencing subject to observing subject (which in 
philosophical phenomenology are one and the same). 
Hence, it is the researcher’s conscious apprehension 
of the participant’s reflection of experience that is the 
object of the epoché, rather than the participant’s 
experience.  
 
In both philosophical and empirical Husserlian 
phenomenology bracketing is directed at two distinct 
kinds of presuppositions: the natural attitude and 
abstract conceptualization. The natural attitude may 
pose a greater obstacle for the experiencing subject, 
while abstract conceptualization carries the greater 
risk for the researcher as observing subject. 
Moreover, the nature of bracketing with regard to 
each kind of presupposition is different. Setting aside 
the natural attitude requires a move of detachment, 
such that the things themselves can be apprehended 
beyond the taken-for-granted assumptions in which 
everyday experience is embedded. In contrast, with 
regard to abstract conceptualization, the epoché 
entails a move toward the practical and concrete so 
that understanding is grounded in the things 
themselves. This is one reason why Giorgi (1970) 
emphasized so strongly the importance of description 
over interpretation. When adopting a Husserlian 
approach to an experience subjectively once removed, 
the researcher is at a greater risk of imposing an 
abstract conceptualization in the form of 
interpretation. As a methodological corrective to this 
potential, anchoring the researcher’s analysis in the 
concrete particulars of the participant’s reflective 
account seems both rigorous and well considered.  
 
The hermeneutic circle, stemming from Heideggerian 
phenomenology, begins with the assumption that 
researcher bias makes understanding possible. At the 
same time, there is acknowledgement that 
misunderstanding also follows from bias. The 
researcher therefore strives to discern between the 
two by inviting confirmation and contradiction via 
ongoing engagement with the phenomenon in 
question. The hermeneutic circle describes the 
process of projecting oneself into a phenomenon in 
order to understand it, initially on the basis of one’s 
presuppositions and then listening for the friction 
between those presuppositions and contradictory 
feedback from the object of inquiry. This feedback 
allows for researchers to catch a glimpse of their 
biases as well discover as novel aspects of that which 
they seek to understand. 
 
Despite methodological differences, both Husserlian 
and Heideggerian approaches adopt similar stances 
with respect to evidence gathering in the process of 
answering a research question. Although this 
approach can be called empirical in the sense that it 
seeks to learn from experience – both the experience 
of the participant and the researcher’s experience of 
that experience - I think a better term would be 
argumentative, if that word is used in its original 
sense.  
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According to Smith (1998), original argument had 
several defining features. First, it was collaborative 
and practically oriented. In other words, an argument 
was a conversation directed toward the goal of 
solving a problem or answering a question. A second 
feature of original argument was that it involved 
listening to evidence that challenged or complicated 
one’s position, and allowing the understanding of the 
problem to evolve as a result of this evidence. 
Another feature of original argument identified by 
Smith is its balanced composition of logos, ethos, and 
pathos. Hence, while logical reasoning played an 
important role in argumentation the trustworthiness 
and emotional engagement of an argument were also 
crucial features. This stands in contrast to the more 
contemporary sense of argument in which logical 
reasoning is considered paramount. Analytical 
philosophy and the natural scientific method (as well 
as some manifestations of phenomenological 
research) both consider logical or methodical 
precision and the demonstration that one’s research is 
done “cleanly and correctly” (Bazerman, 1988, p. 
272) as the central criteria for validity. 
 
My characterization of phenomenology as 
argumentative in the original sense is intended to 
underscore its human and historical sensibility. When 
Husserl (1970) advocates a return to the things 
themselves and Gadamer (1989) argues against 
methodical precision in favor of dialogue, both are 
promoting a way of doing research, or of answering a 
question or solving a problem, that is based in the 
way humans originally understand. In this sense, the 
natural attitude against which Husserl cautions is not 
natural at all, at least not in the sense of originality. 
Instead, it is an attitude that has been layered upon 
our original sensibility, privileging objectivity and 
rationality to the exclusion of relationality and 
empathic engagement. 
 
Although I have suggested that phenomenology is 
grounded in original argument, we must also 
acknowledge that there are many forms of practice 
called phenomenological. As highlighted by both 
Giorgi (2008) and Walsh and Koelsch (2012), the 
extent of methodological and epistemological 
variation in current phenomenological research makes 
it difficult to ascertain even basic common features. It 
is therefore unsurprising that argument is taken up in 
many different ways. These different ways can be 
best appreciated by elaborating Smith’s (1998) 
analysis of argumentative forms or styles. 
 
Smith (1998) explores both the character of original 
argument and its shift in form over time. The 
contemporary understanding of argument is a result of 
its move away from an engaged, collaborative context 
in favor of disengaged debate. In this new 
understanding, advancing a position becomes the 
central concern. From this disengaged stance one can 
pursue demonstration, which seeks to strengthen 
one’s claims and insulate them against criticism, or 
pursue dialectic, which identifies counterpoints with 
respect to the matter at hand in order to synthesize 
from those counterpoints a coherent position. The 
latter of these more closely approximates the spirit of 
original argument, but it shares with demonstration a 
detached approach to understanding and an emphasis 
on logos (logic) as a central criterion for validity.  
 
In order to apply Smith’s (1998) analysis to the 
current practice of phenomenological research, we 
must consider the two relational contexts in which all 
research occurs. The first of these contexts is the 
conversational domain in which the researcher and his 
or her participants are embedded. The manner in 
which a researcher engages with participants 
determines the form of argument that follows. 
Churchill’s (2012) elaboration of first, second, and 
third person perspectives is particularly relevant in 
this regard. The second relational context is that 
which unfolds between the researcher as author and 
his or her audience. In this context, the researcher 
shifts from exploring evidence with participants to 
presenting evidence to an audience of scholars and 
fellow researchers. 
 
It is then necessary to examine the forms that 
argument can take in the first domain of conversation 
between researcher and participant. Churchill (2012), 
drawing from a host of other phenomenological 
scholars, distinguishes between first person, third 
person, and the ideal of second person perspectives in 
phenomenological research. The first person 
perspective is concerned with imagining the other’s 
standpoint from one’s own vantage point, while the 
third person perspective is oriented toward observing 
the other’s behaviour without concern for his or her 
subjective experience. In contrast to these two 
perspective, the second person perspective “is a 
special mode of access to the other that occurs within 
the first person plural: in experiencing the other 
within the we” (Churchill, p. 2, emphasis in original). 
In relation to Smith’s (1998) analysis, this second 
person perspective seems characteristic of original 
argument.  
 
Although for both Churchill (2012) and Smith (1998) 
this collaborative relational engagement is essential to 
phenomenological understanding, it is important to 
acknowledge that not all qualitative research – even 
that framed as phenomenological – is pursued along 
these lines. Indeed, the first person and third person 
perspectives, which we could align with the 
dialectical and demonstrative forms of argument 
respectively, seem quite common in practice. When 
bracketing is employed to expurgate bias and access 
participants’ experience directly, it is a dialectical 
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process that entails imagining the counterpoint of 
another’s experience. Similarly, amidst the herme-
neutical process of oscillating between one’s pre-
understandings and misunderstandings one may also 
engage in a dialectical process. The dialectical nature 
of these approaches follows from the first person 
position of the researcher. When the epoché or the 
hermeneutic circle fit Churchill’s designation of the 
first person perspective, they are practiced as 
imaginative rather than collaborative activities. Since 
imaginative understanding is refined intellectually 
rather than relationally, it must rely on criteria such as 
logical coherence and procedural rigour for 
refinement and justification. 
 
The demonstrative approach to argument, with a third 
person perspective, is also apparent in some forms of 
hermeneutic phenomenological research. When 
detached interpretive reading supplants relational 
engagement, interpretive analysis becomes a matter of 
demonstration, compiling observational evidence to 
support the observer’s position. In this case, the 
hermeneutic circle becomes a process of continuous 
strengthening of one’s own argument rather than 
engaging in dialogue. When divorced from true 
dialogue this refinement must rely on the criteria of 
logical coherence and procedural rigour for 
justification. 
 
The forms of argument and perspective explored 
above can also be considered in relation to 
Heidegger’s (1962) characterization of modes of 
engagement. The distinctions between ready-to-hand, 
present-at-hand, and unready-to-hand ways of being 
(and knowing) can both inform and complicate our 
concern for evidence and argument in research. If the 
ready-to-hand mode denotes engaged activity, then 
both original argument and the second person 
perspective are relevant in this regard. In both cases, 
we could say that understanding is made possible to 
the degree that participants allow themselves to 
become lost in conversation. However, the phrase lost 
in conversation reminds us that the ready-to-hand 
mode is predominantly unreflective, and hence 
seemingly contradictory to the goal of novel 
understanding. This highlights the appeal of dialectic 
and demonstration, which strive to step out of the 
potentially unreflective standpoint of engaged activity 
in order to gain and affirm a new (detached) 
perspective. What is sacrificed in these rhetorical 
moves is collaborative understanding, which perhaps 
need not be so readily abandoned. Alternatively, we 
might consider the unready-to-hand mode of 
engagement, whereby new understanding is made 
possible because something that is taken for granted 
breaks down or becomes problematic.  
 
Questions can then be asked regarding whether 
original argument and the second person perspective 
are indicative of the unready-to-hand mode of 
engagement and, if this is indeed the case, what this 
tells us about evidence and argument. In terms of the 
first question, it is important to remember that one of 
the defining features of original argument was its 
orientation toward solving a problem. Moreover, 
original argument entailed listening for evidence that 
complicated or problematized one’s initial 
(unreflective) understanding. Hence, it is possible to 
say that the second person perspective in 
phenomenology affirms the problem of unreflective 
understanding and in so doing allows for reflective 
understanding. This form of understanding is not 
made reflective through detachment but rather 
through the collaborative engagement that makes 
understanding a problem. In other words, under-
standing of a certain sort is not at all difficult from a 
detached perspective because it only entails building 
an argument that is logically coherent. It becomes 
problematic only when we feel the friction of our 
initial understanding brushed up against the 
disconfirming evidence of our conversational partner. 
Recognizing this problem facilitates reflective 
understanding of what was previously lived out 
unreflectively. 
 
Returning to the question of evidence and original 
argument it is therefore possible to say that evidence 
emerges in the context of collaborative conversation 
oriented toward the goal of solving a problem. This 
collaborative conversation enables participants to 
render problematic, and thus reflect on, the taken-for-
granted features of their initial understandings and in 
so doing invite new understandings. It is also possible 
to say that evidence discovered in this way is different 
from evidence that is gathered in the service of 
advancing a position or making a case. The latter 
course of action involves corroboration more than 
discovery, thus strengthening the case for what the 
researcher already knows to be true. In 
phenomenological research, the former approach 
increases the likelihood of complicating the object of 
study, whereas the latter approach makes 
simplification more likely.  
 
The advantage of dialectical and demonstrative 
approaches is that they tend to move progressively 
toward greater clarity and precision. By beginning 
from and remaining in the first or third person 
perspectives, dialectic and demonstration bring order 
to a discrete set of evidence by increasingly refining 
the evidence in the set. On the other hand, in 
conversation evidence emerges and changes such that, 
at least initially, clarity and precision decrease over 
time. As a consequence, the researcher engaged in 
original argument is likely to incur confusion as the 
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A practical implication of the distinctions drawn thus 
far pertains to the common practice in 
phenomenological research of obtaining written 
protocols or accounts of their experience from 
participants. While this practice generates a text that 
fixes what is said, and therefore makes it more 
accessible to analysis (Ricoeur, 1973), in terms of our 
current concerns it seems to turn away from the 
prospect of original argument. Authoring a written 
protocol evokes a present-at-hand detachment from 
lived experience and the evidence with which a 
researcher is presented may therefore be both simpler 
than and once removed from engaged activity. 
Attempts to understand this experiential account will 
be further simplified by the researcher’s detachment 
(engaging in textual analysis rather than conversation) 
and first person perspective (relying on imagination 
rather than dialogue to discern participants’ lived 
experience). The results that follow from these 
procedures are more readily accessible to thematic 
description, but potentially are at some distance from 
the lived experience that was the original object of 
interest. 
 
An alternative methodological practice that is more in 
line with original argument entails entering the 
“playground of language” (Walsh, 2004, p. 117) and 
“experiencing the other within the we” (Churchill, 
2012, p. 2) through collaborative conversation with 
participants. Heeding Gadamer’s (1989) call to be 
concerned less with methodical rigour and more with 
collaborative understanding, this approach aims to 
generate dialogue between researcher and 
participants. Such dialogue, which is by necessity 
mutually reflexive, has as its goal novel 
understanding for all involved. It also provides for 
thematic analysis evidence that can explicate the 
researcher’s role in co-constituting the research 
results.  
 
To summarize the results of our query thus far, we 
can say that phenomenological research, to the extent 
that it is rooted in original argument, is collaborative, 
mutually reflexive, and oriented toward discovery. 
This approach to discovery cultivates an unready-to-
hand mode of engagement that affirms the 
problematic, intertwined nature of understanding and 
misunderstanding and via this affirmation strives to 
catch glimpses of the implicit features of lived 
experience – including the lived experience of telling 
and listening to storied accounts of experience. In 
contrast, it is also possible to say that 
phenomenological research rooted in contemporary 
rather than original argument employs 
methodological detachment in order to interpret or 
imagine the lived experience of an other, and that 
understanding from these perspectives is refined 
through the principle criterion of logical coherence. 
 
Although the paper thus far has discussed evidence 
and argument in the methodological conduct of 
phenomenological research, it must be noted that the 
original argument and its alternatives again emerge at 
the point of presenting findings to an audience. While 
to some degree the manner of presentation is shaped 
by disciplinary norms, within these established 
structures there is also variability regarding how and 
to whom arguments are made. The whom is 
constituted, at least in part, by the how. In other 
words, the manner of engagement undertaken by the 
author/researcher solicits a particular kind of 
audience. An approach grounded in original argument 
invites the reader or listener into the complexity of the 
phenomenon, revealing both the ambiguity of 
findings as well as the position from which they were 
apprehended (via reflexive self-disclosure). This 
constitutes the audience as participants in a 
conversation rather than as witnesses to the 
demonstration of facts. In contrast, research presented 
via contemporary argument presents conclusions in a 
manner designed to prove a point and to deflect 
potential criticism (rather than to invite dialogue). 
This latter approach is best demonstrated by the 
common practice of identifying potential short-
comings of one’s research in order to inform future 
studies. This often takes the form of rote disclaimers 
regarding the size or unique features of the sample of 
participants, rather than disclosing the problems 
discovered during the course of the study.  
 
In light of the preceding discussion regarding the 
second person perspective and the unready-to-hand 
mode of engagement, the way in which original 
argument might shape the process of presenting 
research can be considered. First, as mentioned 
above, a presentation that invites the audience to 
collaboratively consider the research question and 
results would seem consonant with original argument. 
This would entail thorough disclosure of the 
researcher’s presuppositions, doubts and regrets, and 
complicating questions that emerged over the course 
of the study. Rather than insulating the researcher’s 
conclusions from scrutiny, this style of presentation 
would affirm that acknowledging the complicated and 
problematic nature of a study invites (via an unready-
to-hand mode of engagement) discovery and novel 
understanding. It would also recognize the 
presentation of results as a turn that forms part of a 
conversation instead of being the final word. 
 
A second way in which original argument could 
inform the practices of presentation and publication 
would be by underscoring the complementary criteria 
of logos, ethos, and pathos for evaluating the quality 
of qualitative research. Phenomenological research 
seems ideally suited to this balance of criteria as the 
person of the researcher and the emotional valence of 
the phenomenon, as well as the logical coherence, are 
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explicitly endorsed as central to understanding. The 
breadth of these criteria, which encompass the 
relational aspects of research, can make for a truly 
human science. As highlighted by Todres and Galvin 
(2005), breadth invites depth as well because it moves 
beyond a coherent yet simple account to one that is 
complex and nuanced. This is true not just of the lived 
experience that is the object of phenomenological 
research, but also of the intersubjective practice of 
sharing research findings with others.  
 
The past decade has seen growth in the variety of 
presentational formats for qualitative research. 
However, it must be noted that diversity of 
presentational style does not ensure breadth with 
respect to the criteria of original argument. Without 
adequate disclosure of the context of the research, 
which includes the researcher’s role in and 
perspective on the phenomenon studied, the 
uncertainties and complexities revealed over the 
course of the research (i.e., the intertwining of 
understanding and misunderstanding) and the logic of 
the researcher’s question and conclusions, a novel 
presentational format can remain as detached and 
inaccessible as the most abstract theoretical or 
methodical argument. One example in this regard is 
performative social science. The promise of 
performative presentation is its potential to break free 
from a single-minded focus on rhetorical precision as 
the criterion for validity. However, the risk is a swing 
toward dramatic presentations that strive for impact to 
the exclusion of engaged, reflective dialogue. By 
grounding novel presentational practices, whether 
performative or otherwise, in original argument, 
phenomenological researchers can explore lived 
relational experience within the context of lived 
relational experience. 
 
This discussion of evidence and argument in 
phenomenological research takes place amidst calls 
for evidence-based practice in medicine, nursing, 
psychotherapy, and pedagogy. These calls have 
frequently been answered with dictates for a specific 
type of research rather than with discussion of the 
manner in which any type of research is conducted 
rhetorically. This exploration of different forms of 
argument, with original argument as a comparative 
standard, suggests that evidence-based research can 
be either discovery oriented or demonstrative in 
practice and presentation, with distinct implications 
for the professional world we co-constitute. 
Demonstrative research, phenomenological or 
otherwise, focuses on validating what is already 
presumed to be true. It does so in a methodical 
manner which is aimed at minimizing alternative 
interpretations. In contrast, argumentative research, in 
the original sense of the term, seeks dialogue with 
participants as well as with colleagues, inviting 
complexity and contradiction with respect to both the 
topic of research and the researcher’s perspective and 
embracing the problematic and utterly relational 
nature of understanding.  
 
To the extent that evidence-based research begins and 
ends with concern for concrete practices in 
interpersonal contexts, phenomenology seems ideally 
suited to the task. In recalling the features of original 
argument, we are reminded that research can be 
phenomenological in orientation toward both the 
practices that are the object of study and the practices 
of the research itself. Through affirming both aspects 
of phenomenological practice, it is possible to pursue 
evidence-based research that invites conversation 
rather than seeks the final word. In so doing, we can 
heed Von Eckartsberg’s (1986) call to “make our 
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